Monday, June 9, 2008

The Same Problem of Philosophy

There is a distinction between what is known by sense perception and what is known by the intellect. For example, if you look at a penny from a certain point of view, it will appear elliptical. This is not a natural way to think about it, but no doubt what is seen is an ellipse. The intellect allows us to believe that from another point of view, the normal point of view, the penny will appear round. But this is a different mode of belief. We cannot be mistaken about the penny appearing to be an ellipse, but we can be mistaken that the penny will appear round from another point of view.

Now to the question, are we immediately aware of physical objects? Are physical objects always (or sometimes) just as they are known to be in sense perception?

Take as a first premise that the properties of objects do not depend on the perspective or location of the observer. The penny is how it is independent of where or how I am. However a penny appears round from one point of view and elliptical from another. The shape that we are perceiving must not be a part of the real penny. The color of the penny also depends on my point of view. So the color must not be a part of the real penny either. Everything I am aware of about the penny depends on my point of view.

So do we sense the real object? Or do we sense something else, assuming the real object exists.

It is now clear that what I am immediately aware of depends on my point of view. The real object, however, does not. What it is that I sense does not behave the way the real object is supposed to behave. Therefore I am not immediately aware of the real object. I believe it is something besides the real object of which I am immediately aware.